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THE EQUITABLE REMEDIAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE
SooN after the principle of Erie Railroad v. Tonpkins I had been extended
to suits in equity, 2 some federal courts established a competing rule by reviv-
ing the doctrine of equitable remedial rights. Invoking this concept equita-
ble remedies have been administered by federal courts in diversity cases,
without always following the practice of courts of the state in which they
1. 304 U. S. 64 (1938). The legal literature upon the effect of this decision has been
collected in 1 MoonE, FEDERAL PRAcricE (Supp. 1945) 47, note 1; -ee Clark, State Law in
the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erice r. Tompkins (1946) 55 YAnL L. J.
267, 271. The Erie rule has been generally limited in its application to suits arising under
diversity and alienage jurisdiction. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal DpOuit Ins. Corp.,
315 U. S. 447 (1942); accord: Clearfield Trust Co. v. U. S., 318 U. S. 363 (1943); Deitric:
v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940); Board of Commissioners v. U. S., 303 U. S. 343 (1939).
For the suggestion that state statutes of limitations will govern cases predicated upon
general federal question jurisdiction see infra note 73.
2. In Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938), decided one wee: after
Erie R. 1? v. Tompkins, the Court said, "The doctrine [of the Erie case] applies though the
question of construction [of an insurance contract] arises not in an action at latv, but in a
suit in equity." Id. at 205. Cases reiterating and extending the Ruhlin principle have been
collected in York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. (2d) 503, 525, note 42 CIC.. A. 2d, 1944)
re'd, 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
were sitting. 3 In Black and Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n,4 for example, an in-
junction was sought in the District Court for the District of Delaware to
restrain a rival wood dealer from trade libel. Delaware law afforded a right of
action for damages to a person who received legal injury from the disparage-
ment of his goods but did not authorize enjoining a continuing libel. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a judgment of the District Court
dismissing the complaint and ordered the injunction to issue, holding that
". .. in so far as equitable remedies are concerned federal courts are to
grant them in accordance with their own rules which have been developed
out of the English Chancery practice." I In addition to certain holdings of
the Third Circuit,' examples of the use of this device to avoid state law may
be found in cases of the Second,7 Fourth " and Eighth ' Circuits. Most
courts, however, have not u~ilized this concept of remedial rights, but have
followed state law as to the type of relief to be granted. 10 On the theory that
3. The problem of remedial rights must be maintained in its perspective. The limited
aim of this discussion is to force an elimination of whatever remains of the doctrine. The
somewhat extensive citations of examples of the doctrine, infra notes 6-9, 94-99 have been
included to define its ramifications and not to magnify the extent of its use.
4. 129 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 672 (1942).
5. Id. at 233. Circuit Judge Biggs continued, "The rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
being determinative of substantive rights, there is still preserved to the federal courts a
uniform basis for granting equitable remedies in cases in which substantive rights have
arisen under state laws." Ibid. See Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 146 F. (2d) 889, 923, note 55
(C. C. A. 3d, 1944) (dissent).
6. Maxwell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co., 131 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942);
First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Cas. &Sur. Co., 132 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A. 3d,
1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 749 (1943); Orth v. Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A.
3d, 1942). The Delaware District Court has been persistent in upholding the remedial
rights rationale. Homewood v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 55 F. Supp. 100 (D. Del.
1944); Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, 52 F. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943); Dunn v. Wilson &
Co., 51 F. Supp. 655 (D. Del. 1943); see Perrott v. U. S. Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 955,
957 (D. Del. 1944); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 201 (D. Del. 1944);
Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418, 422 (D. Del. 1944); S.E.C. v. Fiscal Fund,
Inc., 48 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D. Del. 1943); Dunn v. Wilson & Co., 53 F. Supp. 205, 208 (D.
Del. 1943).
7. York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), rev'd, 326 U. S. 99
(1945); see Schwarz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 110 F. (2d) 465, 467 (C. C. A, 2d,
1940). Another device is used in Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 874 (1945); see infra note 63.
8. Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944).
9. Herzbergs, Inc. v. Ocean Ace. & Guar. Corp., 42 F. Supp. 52 (D. -Nebr. 1941),
aff'd, 132 F. (2d) 438 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943). In a suit for reformation of an insurance contract
the federal court adopted the classification of "remedial" used by the state court for pur-
poses of their own conflict of law doctrine and then applied the remedial rights rationale to
this borrowed characterization. See Cooir, LOGICAL AND LEGAL. BASES OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1942) 163-5 for critique of such practices.
10. The use of the equitable remedial rights doctrine has been uniformly disapproved.
First Circuit, National Fruit Product Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass.
1942), aff'd, 140 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944). Second Circuit, Zachs v. Aronson, 49 F.
Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1943); U. S. v. Certain Lands in Highlands, N. Y., 49 F. Supp, 962
[Vol. 55 :401
1946] THE EQUITABLE REMEDIAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 403
equitable remedies involve more than a question of procedure, these courts
have applied the rule of the Erie case. The Fifth 11 and Tenth "- Circuits, for
instance, have stated that by bringing a suit in a federal court the litigant
may obtain no remedies other than those afforded him by local statutes and
decisions.
13
As the Supreme Court has not yet fully clarified the status of remedial
rights, 14 individual instances of usage of the doctrine still occur. In many of
these cases the courts clearly have not been conscious of any issue involving
the selection of equitable remedies, but have concerned themnelves prin-
cipally with substantive law. The test of the doctrine, however, lies in a
comparison of the federal remedy actually granted with the relief obtainable
in the state court, and not in whether the selection was deliberately made in
terms of the equitable remedial rights rationale.
I Appraisal of the remedial rights concept is complicated by an undefined
and ambiguous terminology which pervades most decisions. The termi-
(S. D. N. Y. 1943); Smith v. Aeolian Co., 53 F. Supp. 636 (D. Conn. 1943); Bohn v. Amer-
ican Export Lines, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Palmer v. Palmer, 31 F. Supp.
861 (D. Conn. 1940). Third Circuit, Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 51 F.
Supp. 459 (WV. D. Pa. 1943); Moreschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613 (AV. D. Pa. 1939);
Kravas v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939). Fourth Circuit, King
v. Richardson, 46 F. Supp. 510 (M. D. N. C. 1942). Fifth Circuit, Park v. Park, 37 F. Supp.
185 (N. D. Ga. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 123 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) and caces
cited infra note 11. Sizth Circuit, McAndrews v. Bellmap, 141 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 6th,
1944); Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp. 146 (XV. D. Mich. 1940). Scrn:th1 Circuit, Elastic
Stop Nut Corp. v. Greer, 62 F. Supp. 363 (N. D. Ill. 1945); Ross v. Service Line, 31 F.
Supp. 871 (E. D. Ill. 1940). ANinth Circuit, Robinson v. Linfield College, 42 F. Supp. 147
(E. D. Wash. 1941), af'd, 136 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943), cert. der.i d, 320 U. S. 795
(1943); Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); Howell v. Deady, 43 F.
Supp. 104 (D. Ore. 1939). Tenth Circuit, Meyer v. City of Eufaula, 132 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A.
10th, 1942), see infra note 12.
11. Fakouri v. Cadais, 147 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) (federal court held em-
powered to set aside probate decree only if state court could grant same remedy); accord,
Park v. Park, 123 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Wells Fargo Bank & Tr. Co. v. Titus,
41 F. Supp. 171 (S. D. Tex. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 134 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 5th,
1943); cf. Howard v. U. S., 125 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942); see Commercial Nat. Banl
v. Parsons, 144 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944), cert. da.cd, 323 U. S. 796 (1945); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Haack, 50 F. Supp. 55 (I. D. La. 1943). But Ece Rambo ,. U. S.,
145 F. (2d) 670, 672 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945), cr. denied, 325 U. S. 858 (1945).
12. Meyer v. City of Eufaula, 132 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942). In a suit to fore-
close a lien upon property of delinquent municipal improvement bondholders federal equity
was held to be without power to grant foreclosure as such a remedy was not authorized by
Oklahoma law. The court specifically denunciates the remedial rights rationale invohed by
appellant. Id. at 652-3. For a similar unequivocal rejection, see Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F.
(2d) 685, 696 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939).
13. This same idea has been stated conversely "A party forfeits nothing by going into a
Federal tribunal. Jurisdiction having attached, his case is tried there upon the same prin-
ciples, and its determination is governed by the same considerations, as if it had been brought
in the proper state tribunal of the same locality." Ex par/e McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 243 (U. S.
1871).
14. See infra section III.
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nological problem is integrated with the legal one of determining the value
of precedent. For purposes of this discussion the two are dissociated.
II
Precedent. Federal independence in the grant of equitable remedies has
been based upon pre-1938 decisions concerning federal enforcement of state
statutes 15 which attempted to (1) blend law and equity in the state courts,
(2) substitute an equitable action for a legal one, (3) impair the right of the
federal court to hear a suit by vesting exclusive jurisdiction of such causes
in a particular state court, (4) prevent federal cognizance of a suit by the
creation of an adequate remedy at law in the courts of the state, (5) control
federal equity practice and procedure and (6) render equitable relief in-
appropriate by changing the substantive requirements for an equitable
remedy. Reexamined in the light of the new Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 11 and the Erie decision, these cases appear inadequate as precedents
for the equitable remedial rights rationale.
Since 1818 the federal courts have refused to apply state statutes which
commingled law and equity. 7 In the leading case, Robinson v. Campbell,'8
the defendant to an action of ejectment sought to interpose an equitable
defense converted into a legal defense by a Tennessee statute. The Supreme
Court held the statutory defense unavailable to a litigant in the federal
court saying, ". . . the remedies in the courts of the United States are to be,
at common law or in equity, not according to the practice of state courts,
but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished
and defined in that country [England] from which we derive our knowledge
of those principles ... ,, '9 Whatever their relevance to remedial rights
15. Under Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842), only in cases involving state statutes,
property and local law were the federal courts required to follow state law. Since, on the
federal equity side, state legislation regulating court practice was not controlling, see infra
note 35, the problem then as now was to separate state "substantive" statutes from "pro-
cedural" ones. Upon cases of statutory categorization the equitable remedial rights doctrine
was founded. Cases based upon this dichotomy between "substance" and "procedure,"
however, may be misleading today since under Erie v. Tompkins the policy emphasis has
shifted to uniformity within a state. Therefore early classifications must be critically re-
analyzed. For a discussion of federal common law under Swift v. Tyson see 1 MOORE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE (1938) 74-103.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. following 28 U. S. C. § 723c (1940); authorized by 48 STAT. 1064
(1934), 28 U. S. C. § 723b, c, (1940).
17. Yorkv. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F. (2d) 503, 521-2 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
18. 3 Wheat. 212 (U. S. 1818).
19. Id. at 222. The line between law and equity may have been maintained originally
for the sake of tradition alone. Von Moschzisker, Equity Ju~risdiction in the Federal Courts
(1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 287, 295-6; Comment (1936) 49 HARV. L. Rrv. 950, 955. Also,
state code procedure could not be adopted because the procedure of the federal courts
on their law side conformed to state practice, while in equity it was governed by rules pro-
mulgated by the Supreme Court, see infrc note 35. But the need for preserving the Consti-
tutional right to a jury trial was always a factor in the separation. See A. M. DOMEa, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1928) 662; Comment (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 104, 107.
See infra note 25 and text accompanying.
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problems, the cases which maintained this distinction between law and
equity despite state code reform I appear to be directly overruled by the
federal unification of law and equity into one form of action.
2 '
The new Rules also abrogate those cases which refused to enforce state
legislation authorizing an equitable remedy in situations where a remedy at
law already existed in the federal forum."2 This problem was typified by
Whielhzead v. Shattuck: 23 pursuant to an Iowa statute a claimait, out of
possession of land, brought suit to quiet title against the person in posses-
sion. The Iowa statute was held unenforceable in the federal court and the
suit dismissed on the ground that the action of ejectment afforded relief in
these circumstances. 24 Underlying this decision 25 is the consideration that
20. Livingston v. Story, 9 Pet. 632 (U. S. 1835) (Louisiana Civil law procedure did not
affect federal court); Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669 (U. S. 1850) (Texa statutory
blending of law and equity inoperative in federal court); Fenn v. Holme, 21 How. 431 (U. S.
1858) (Mississippi merger of law and equity ineffective in federal court); ThompZon v. Rail-
road Companies, 6 Wall. 134 (U. S. 1867) (Code procedure of Ohio not followed); ree In re
Sawyer 124 U. S. 200, 210 (1888).
21. "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action." FED. R. Civ. P.,
Rule 2. Varying interpretations have been accorded this Rule which was deigned to ob-
literate all distinctions between law and equity. Compare the discussion of Justice Thurman
Arnold in Groome v. Steward, 142 F. (2d) 756 (App. D. C. 1944) with Ettelson v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 317 U. S. 188 (1942). See 1 Moonr, FrnEn=u. Pnc'ncE (1938) § 2.04;
3 id. (Supp. 1945) 28-34.
22. Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106 (1891) (statutory creditor's bill as substitute for lav
action on contract claim dismissed); Cates v. Allen, 149 U. S. 451 (1893) (same); Pusey &
Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491 (1923) (statutory receivership in lieu of contract action
refused); Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S. 121 (1930) (suit authorized by
statute to enjoin collection of state tax instead of action for recovery of payment dismiz-c-d);
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521 (1932) (same). Both the Henrielt 2fills and Rzclers
cases would be prohibited today by the Johnson Act, S0 STAT. 738 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (1)
(1940). Compare with them the situation where the remedy at law in the federal courts is
inadequate. Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153 (1879) (statutory suit for injunc-
tion against collection of state tax sustained); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schuader,
291 U. S. 24 (1934) (same); :f. Stratton -. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 284 U. S. 530
(1932). There are strong considerations of comity which pervade these state tax cases. This
policy eventually led to the Johnson Act which now prevents such problems from arising.
23. 138U.S. 146 (1891).
24. In Reynolds v. Crawfordsville First Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 405 (1834), an Indiana
statute identical with the Iowa statute in the Mitehead case was held to merely change the
substantive requirements of the remedy of quiet title and so was enforceable in the federal
courts. In this case the suit was brought by a person out of possession of land but since an
injunction to restrain waste was involved ejectment did not lie as an alternative remedy;
accord, Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (U. S. 1839) and cases cited infra note 40.
25. The actual decision was based upon Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT.
82 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1940) which forbade suits in equity in any case where a plain,
adequate and complete remedy could be had at law. As originally introduced this cection
would have served to limit relief in equity to those cases where there vs ro remedy at law,
but as enacted the section was only declaratory of the law as it then ewisted and cerved to
protect the common law right to jury trial. The Seventh Amendment did not assume this
function until 1791, two years later. As a politic measure to insure the integrity of law courts
from equity encroachment, Section 16 was unnecessary in the federal courts where there
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an equity proceeding would have deprived the litigants of their Constitu-
tional guarantee of jury trial "in suits at common law." 25 Today, however,
if an issue arises in a factual context which was formerly a legal cause of
action, under Rule 38 jury trial may be obtained upon that issue regardless
of how the action is framed.Y Since the right of jury trial is thus assured,
the state-created remedy should no longer be unavailable in the federal
courts because of a possibility of alternative legal relief. s
Two further lines of cases, sometimes cited as authority for the equitable
remedial rights doctrine, have established that a state statute cannot impair
federal jurisdiction either directly, by giving exclusive jurisdiction of certain
causes to a particular state court,29 or indirectly, by creating an adequate
were never two competing court systems but one court sitting alternately at law and in
equity. Warren, History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37 HARV. L. Rnv. 49,
96-7; see Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210,215 (U. S. 1830); Whitehead v. Shattuck,
138 U.S. 146, 150-1 (1891); Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U. S. 92,94 (1932); Denison
v. Keck, 13 F. (2d) 384, 386 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926). But cf. Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rnv. 66, 68,
note 7, suggesting that Section 16 was intended to limit federal equity power.
26. U.S. CONST. Ati.END. VII.
27. The word "issue" in Rule 38 was deliberately chosen to deemphasize the distinction
between legal and equitable forms of action. See James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal
Rules of Procedure (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1022, 1032, 1036; 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PAcTIcE
(1938) 3013-9 (basic nature of issue controls jury trials).
28. Section 16 of the Judiciary Act should no longer create a bar to such a suit. The
Federal Rules Committee Note to Rule 2, April, 1937 Draft, stated that Section 16 was
thereby superseded. However, the final Committee Note described the section as modified.
See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE (1938) 108. Draftsmen of the proposed new Judicial
Code, U. S. CODE Title 28, report that Section 16 [28 U. S. C. § 384 (1940) ] will be left out
completely in the new revision. Two cases under the new Rules have considered the effect of
an alternate remedy at law upon an equity action. In Keen9 v. Hale-Halsell Co., 118 F.
(2d) 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), a creditor's bill was filed against 'the debtor's widow before the
contract debt had been reduced to judgment. In sustaining ju sdiction over the action, the
court said "Nor will the suit then be defeated by the decision 6f Scott v. Neely [or] Cates v.
Allen. . . . The reaso-ns there given for dismissing the bill, or remanding it, were that the
existence and amount of the debt made a law issue, and a jury trial of it could not be afforded
the debtor in equity; and that the creditors had not exhausted their remedies at law. Thege
reasons will not be good in this case if they be urged by the administratrix, for the Rules of
Civil Procedure will now apply, and under them all remedies, legal and equitable, are availa-
ble, anda jury trial of issues that constitute a case at common law in the meaning of the
Constitution may easily be separately had." Id. at 335. But see the obiler dictum in Harlan
v. Sparks, 125 F. (2d) 502, 506 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942), a case in which the effect of the Rules
was not considered. However, state statutory enlargement of an equitable remedy to en-
compass a legal cause of action must be subject to the qualification that it will be inoperative
to create federal jurisdiction. White v. Sparkhill Realty Corp., 280 U. S. 500 (1930). This
limitation would only arise when the complaint for such an equity action was drawn to
include a general federal question and has no application to diversity cases. So the decisions
other than the tax cases, supra note 22, cannot be justified on this ground. See 1 MoORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 184-5.
29. Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67 (U. S. 1840) (law action against administrator of
insolvent estate sustained despite state statute prohibiting the action); Union Bank of Tenn.
v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 18 How. 503 (U. S. 1855) (recovery on judgment creditor's bill not barred
by statute requiring all suits against administrators to be brought in probate court); Water-
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remedy at law in the state court. ° Poyne v. Hook,3' wherein a bill in a federal
court to obtain a distributive share of an estate was sustained notwithstand-
ing a Missouri statute giving exclusive jurisdiction of suits against adminis-
trators to the county courts of probate, demonstrates the former type of
statute; and in United States v. Howland.32 a statutory remedy at law in the
courts of Massachusetts v-as held inoperative to defeat the jurisdiction of a
federal court to entertain an equitable suit by the government for an ac-
counting and a mandatory injunction to aid the collection of taxes. Properly
construed, these cases seem valid authority only for the proposition that
state legislation cannot prevent litigants, who meet the statutory require-
ments of federal jurisdiction, from entering the courts of the United States,
and appear to be irrelevant as to what type of equitable remedy the federal
courts may grant.
33
man v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33 (1909) (statute giving excluive
jurisdiction to suits against executors did not bar suit for an accounting); see Pennsylvania
v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 131 (1935); cf. Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30, 35-6 (1935).
30. McConihay v. Wright, 121 U. S. 201 (18S7) (state statutory remedy of ejectment
did not prevent bill quia timet in federal bourt); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202
(1893) (creditor's bill sustained irrespective of adequate state legal remedy); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898) (injunction against enforcement of state statute not barred by
statutory legal remedy in state courts). The cases following Smyll; v. Ames have established
that the adequate remedy at law must exist in the federal court to bar equitable relief.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14 (1924); Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry.,
270 U. S. 378 (1926); cf. Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U. S. 64 (1935) (bill in
equity to cancel insurance policies did not lie where adequate remedy at law in federal courts
was barred for lack of jurisdictional amount in controversy). When the adequate state legal
remedy also exists in the federal court, equitable relief has been consistently refused. Com-
pare Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 4S1 (1913) (injunction against col-
lection of state tax expressly forbidden by state statute also refused by federal courts be-
cause adequate legal remedy was available in both tribunals) vwith Henrietta .Aillsv. Ruther-
ford County, 281 U. S. 121 (1930).
31. 7 Wall. 425 (U. S. 1863).
32. 4 Wheat. 108 (U. S. 1819).
33. In the Erie decision, the court states: "Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."
304 U. S. at Z8. Since federal jurisdiction is statutorily defined and based upon Article III
of the Constitution, the refusal to allow curtailment by state statute has been reaffirmed
since the Erie case. Blacker v. Thatcher, 145 F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944), cerl. denied,
324 U. S. 848 (1945) (Montana statute giving exclusive jurisdiction of suits against exe-
utors to state courts of probate); Miami County Nat. Bank v. Bancroft, 121 F. (2d) 921
(C. C. A. 10th, 1941) (same); City of Hollis v. Carrell, 42 F. Supp. 393 (W. D. Ola. 1941)
(foreclosure of delinquent municipal improvement bonds sustained despite state ctatute
vesting exclusive jurisdiction in state court); Peterson v. Demmer, 34 F. Supp. 697 (N. D.
Tex. 1940) (suit removed to federal court from state court given exclusive jurisdiction of the
cause by statute); Vanderwater v. City Nat. Bank, 28 F. Supp. 89 (E. D. Ill. 1939) (came);
see Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. S50, 852 (N. D. Cal. 1943) (suit by U. S. officer). Simi-
larly, the principle that an adequate legal remedy in the state courts cannot indirectly bar
federal jurisdiction has been reiterated. The Maccabees v. City of North Chicago, 125 F.
(2d) 330 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942), cerl. denied, 317 U. S. 693 (1943) (federal court sustained suit
for injunction and accounting although state equity court dismissed same because of ad-
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In like manner, decisions that the federal courts are not bound by statutes
regulating the equity practice of state courts, seem to offer little support for
the remedial rights doctrine.34 Whereas, at law, state rules of procedure were
adopted and followed, the federal courts from the beginning of the judiciary
system independently patterned their procedure on the equity side after
English chancery practice.35 The refusal in the past to be controlled by
state law governing equitable procedure has been sanctioned by, and con-
tinued after, the Erie case. 36
It must be noted that whereas the holdings of the last three lines of cases
still survive, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins has overruled any obiter statements
which may be found therein to contravene its policy.3" A critical re-analysis
of prior dicta is required before they may be used as persuasive authority in
the equitable remedial rights cases.-
While reluctant to enforce state statutes creating remedies or remedial
rights, federal courts applying in equity the rule of Swift v. Tyson,39 uni-
formly protected substantive rights created or declared by state legisla-
equate legal remedy); cf. Mutual Ben. Health & Ace. Ass'n v. Teal, 34 F. Supp. 714 (E. D.
S. C. 1940) (defending a contract claim by beneficiaries in state court not a bar to federal
suit for injunction against them from continuing the suit).
34, In Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 648 (U. S. 1832) on a motion to quash execution, an
injunction was held inoperative as a supersedeas notwithstanding a Maryland statute to that
effect. Story, J. said, ". . . acts of Maryland . . . regulating .. .Chancery proceedings
are of no force in relation to the Courts of the United States." Id. at 657. Accord:
Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451 (1892) (on foreclosure of security for a loan, held that at-
torney fees awarded by federal court of equity cannot be limited by state law).
35. Conformity to state practice in equity was not feasible as some of the states had no
equity courts or system to be followed. To remedy this difficulty the Judiciary Act con-
tained the first Process Act, 1 STAT. 93 (1789) which provided only at law should the "modes
of process" be the same as in the state courts. The Conformity Act, 17 STAT. 196 (1872),
continued this scheme. In equity the Supreme Court continually regulated practice, copy-
ing the English Chancery procedure. See Von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 287.
36. In Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161 (1939) the allowance of counsel fees
and expenses was held to lie within historic equity practice and procedure of federal courts
and as such was not controlled by state law; accord, Mercantile-Commerce PTnk & Trust
Co. v. Southeast Arkansas Levee Dist., 106 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939 . Both cases
reaffirm Dodge v. Tulleys, 144 U. S. 451 (1892).
37. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 112 (1945), the Court states: "Dicta
may be cited characterizing equity as an independent body of law. To the extent that
we have indicated, it is. But in so far as these general observations go beyond that, they
merely reflect notions that have been replaced by a sharper analysis of what federal courts
do when they enforce rights that have no'federal origin. And so, before the true source of
law that is applied by the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction was fully explored,
some things were said that would not now be said."
38. "Prior to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins it was not necessary, as we have indicated, to
make the critical analysis required by the doctrine of that case of the nature of jurisdiction
of the federal courts in diversity cases." Id. at 110.
39. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
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tures.40 Since these cases did not involve issues of remedy, they seem in-
apposite to the remedial rights decisions.
To maintain the precedent value of these lines of cases in the face of the
Erie decision, some federal courts have resorted to statutory construction of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. 41 It is argued that the equitable remedial rights
doctrine rests upon Section 11 4 2of that Act which conferred equity jurisdic-
tion upon the federal courts, and that the Erie case destroyed only the legal
and equitable exceptions to Section 34,43 the Rules of Decision Act, and did
40. Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195 (U. S. 1839) (statutory change of substantive require-
ments of quiet title relief); same iwlding, Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15 (1884); Reynolds
v. Crawfordsville First Nat. Bank, 112 U. S. 405 (1884); Frost v. Spitley 121 U. S. 552
(1887); Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314 (1894); Cowley v. Northern Pac. R. R., 159
U. S. 569 (1895); Barden v. Land & River Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327 (1895); Lawzon v. U. S.
Mining Co., 207 U. S. 1 (1907); Denison v. Keck, 13 F. (2d) 384 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); atcord,
Exparle McNiel, 13 Wall. 236 (U. S. 1871) (right to pilotage created by N. Y. statute); Brine
v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627 (1877) (statutory right of redemption enforced); Gormley v.
Clark, 134 U. S. 338 (1890) (Illinois "Burnt Records Act" defined quiet title requirements
after Chicago fire); Mo., Kan. &Tex. Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 351 (1899) (cancella-
tion of usurious contract awarded according to local statutes); Louisville & N. R. R. v. Vet-
ern Union Tel. Co., 234 U. S. 369 (1914) (definition of cloud on title by Mis-ouri statute); Eae
Case of Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 519-20 (U. S. 1874); Mason v. United States, 26D
U. S. 545, 557-8 (1923). Clark v. Smith, supra, and other cases have observed that if the
state legislature created a substantive right and at the same time the remedy to enforce it
and if the remedy was consistent with the ordinary modes of proceeding in chancery, a fed-
eral court might enforce both. Accord: Nic Projector Corp. v. Movie-Jecltor Co., 16 F.
Supp. 605, 606 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); Ingold v. Ingold, 30 F. Supp. 347,34, (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
The rule of Swift v. Tyson that the federal courts were free from state law on matters of
equity jurisprudence or general commercial law has been overruled by the Eric case. E:aam-
ples of this former independence are Neves v. Scott, 13 How. 263 (U. S. 1851) (on a question
of construction of a trust from marriage articles executed in Georgia, held that relevant deci-
sion of Georgia Supreme Court was not controlling); Noonan v. Lee, 2 Blach 499 (U. S.
1862) (foreclosure of mortgage before last installment was due held not available despite
state decisions permitting it); Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1915) (on bill for accounting
and injunction, decisions of Illinois court concerning the effect of a surrender claue in an
oil lease were not controlling); cf. Kirby v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., 120 U. S. 130 (1887),
orerruled, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 112 (1945).
41. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, 1 STArT. 73.
42. 1 STAT. 78 (1789), 28 U.S. C. § 41(1)(1940).
43. 1 STAT. 92 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 725 (1940). The Rules of Decision Act, while limited
by its own terms to "trials at common law," was deemed to be merely declaratory of the
rule which in any event would have governed the federal courts and therefore was equally
applicable to equity suits. Mason v. U. S., 260 U. S. 545, 557-8 (1923); see Havwkins v.
Barney's Lessee, 5 Pet. 457,464 (U. S. 1831); 1 MooRE, FEDE&,L PRAcrzcE (1938) 76. How-
ever a dictum that Section 34 is inapplicable to suits in equity appears in Rus.zell v. Todd,
309 U. S. 280, 287 (1940) and again in the concurring opinion of D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U. S. 447, 467 (1942). This statement has been utilized by judges favoring the
remedial rights doctrine. Eastern Vine Corp. v. Winslov-Warren, Ltd., 137 F. (2d) 955,
960 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 758 (1943) (Frank, J.); McClaskey v. Harbiren-
Walker Refractories Co., 138 F. (2d) 493,496 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943) (Biggs, J.); cf. Car-on v.
Long-Bell Lumber Corp., 73 F. (2d) 397,404 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), cer. deried, 294 U. S. 707
(1935); Brill v. W. B. Foshay Co., 65 F. (2d) 420, 424 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933), cert. de ied,
290 U. S. 643 (1933).
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not reach Section 11. 4 Section 11, however, merely gave the federal courts
power to grant equitable relief.45 The problem of remedial rights revolves
not around the power to grant equitable remedies but around the propriety
of doing so. 6 In addition, this difference in statutory source still cannot
validate those past cases which were either not in point or devitalized by the
Federal Rules. Finally, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins would seem to transcend
the problem of statutory construction to overrule all principles contrary
to its policy.
47
Despite the inadequacy of the statutory argument and lack of decisional
support for the continuation of the equitable remedial rights doctrine,
federal courts have employed several methods of utilizing the early cases as
precedent. The simplest device has been the string citation of cases decided
before 1938 as primary authority for the concept, without further discussion
of their validity or relevance. 48 Another practice has been the non-critical
transposition of statements from a pre-Erie case into an unrelated legal
context. 49 Recent dicta have also been used as precedent without considera-
tion of their original purpose.50 When thus reduced to their essentials, all
these devices appear illogical.
Terminology. The determination of the precedent value of a decision or a
dictum depends upon an understanding of its terms. Confusion has been
caused in past cases by a non-critical usage of two concepts. The first is the
44. Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938) was likewise considered as
not in point towards overruling the remedial rights doctrine. York v. Guaranty Trust
Company of New York, 143 F. (2d) 503, 525 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
45. Once federal jurisdiction has attached to a cause, the power to grant relief, i.e., to
carry the action to its conclusion, may be conceded. Section 11, loc. cit. supra note 42, was
the first statute to define federal jurisdiction. Other Congressional enactments conferring
it are listed in 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) 3457-72.
46. The difference between these two constructions of "equity jurisdiction" is discussed
infra, p. 411.
47. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1945) 122-5.
48. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F, (2d)
503, 522, note 28 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) blanketly lists thirteen early cases as precedent for
remedial rights.
49. In Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377, 381-2 (1941) the Supreme
Court bases its decision upon a quotation from Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U, S. 491,
497 (1923), to the effect that ". . . a remedial right to proceed in a federal court sitting in
equity cannot be enlarged by a state statute. . . ." In the latter case the statement was
employed to protect the right of the corporation to a jury trial; in the former, no question of
jury trial was present. The lack of connection between the two should render inapposite the
Pusey quotation. See Comment (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 193; Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1094.
50. In Black and Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), ceri.
denied, 317 U. S. 672 (1942), the court considered that some remarks made in Sprague v.
Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 164 (1939), preserved federal independence in awarding
equitable remedies. The Sprague dictum concerned the historic freedom of courts of equity
in awarding counsel's fees. Since the counsel was considered an officer of the court, such
matters have traditionally been procedural. The Supreme Court was not thereby making an
exception of equitable remedies from the Erie rule and the inference of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals seems unjustified.
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phrase "equity jurisdiction" when employed in a statement that the equity
jurisdiction of the federal courts can be neither enlarged nor diminished by
state legislation. Four interpretations are found for "jurisdiction" when
used in this connection and a sharp analysis of former decisions is necessary
to determine the sense in which the phrase was employed therein. First, if
the phrase means the power to hear the suit, i.e., federal jurisdiction, the
statement is irrelevant to remedial rights. 1 Second, if "equity jurisdiction"
refers to the equity side of the court as strictly separated from its law, side,
the statement is both obsolete under the Federal Rules and not in point in
remedial rights cases.5 2 Third, if the statement refers only to equity prac-
tice or procedure it is also not relevant authority. 3 The fourth meaning of
"equity jurisdiction" is the judicial discretion as to the type of equitable
relief to be granted.5 4 It is this interpretation which is sought to be estab-
lished to support the remedial rights doctrine-that the propriety of avard-
ing an equitable remedy cannot be controlled by state statute. None of the
cases in which one of the first three constructions is indicated could logically
support the fourth proposition.
The term "remedial" provides a second source of terminological confusion.
While it sometimes refers to the ultimate relief granted by a court," fre-
quently the term is synonymous with "adjective" or "procedural." ' In
addition to this dual meaning of "remedial," the phrase "remedial right"
has been used in decisions as a legal conclusion without definition of its
premises. Thus the Supreme Court has declined to enforce state statutes
51. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425,430 (U.S. 1868); McConihay v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201,
206 (1887); Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U. S. 202, 204 (1893); Waterman v. Canal-
Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U. S. 33, 43 (1909); see 1 T. A. STREET, FF.DERAL Equizy
PRACTICE (1909) 17-18.
52. See A. M. DOBME, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1928) 662-3; J. C.
ROSE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF HE FEDERAL COURTS (1938) 202; Harlan v. Sparksj,
125 F. (2d) 502,506 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942).
53. Spraguev. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161,164 (1939).
54. "While jurisdiction, in its proper sense, means authority to hear and decide a cause,
it is common to speak of jurisdiction in equity or the jurisdiction of a court of equity as not
relating to the power of the court to hear and determine a cause but as to whether it ought
to assume the jurisdiction and hear and decide the cause." Miller v. Rowan, 251 Il. 344,
348-9, 96 N. E. 285, 287 (1911); see Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U. S. 176, 181 (1935);
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. NI. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 368 (1939); Von Mozchzisl:er, Eq-
uity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts (1927) 75 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 287, 291-2; Comment
(1923) 33 YALE L. J. 193; cf. Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30, 36-7 (1935); Fordham,
The Self-Determination of Eguity (1936) 30 ILL. L. Rnv. 716.
55. "Remedial rights are those which a person has to obtain some appropriate remedy
when his primary rights have been violated by another." I PoIEROY, EOtuiT JUrnsrnu-
DENCE (1941) 119; see IV. N. HOHFELD, FUNDA!mENTAL LEr.L CoNcEPTio:;s (1923) 150.
56. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. S. 491, 497 (1923); Kelleam v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377, 382 (1941); Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U. S.
121, 127 (1930); see Guaranty Trust Co. . York, 326 U. S. 99, 115-6 (1945) (disent of
Rutledge, J.). This ambiguity of terms has served to identify "remedy" and "procedure" for
purposes of the Erie rule.
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held to confer a "remedial right," in the sense of "procedural right," while
effectuating those creating substantive rights as required by Swift v. Tyson,
where there was no difference in operative effect between the statutes. For
example, the Delaware statute in Pusey & Jones Company v. Hanssen 67
which allowed an unsecured simple contract creditor of an insolvent corpora-
tign to apply for a receiver before reducing his claim to judgment was held
unenforceable because it conferred a "remedial right." Is In contrast, a
Nebraska statute which authorized a claimant out of possession of his land to
bring suit to quiet title against his rivals was held in Holland v. Ciallen 69 to
create only a new substantive right and to be enforceable. As both statutes
merely granted traditional 60 equitable remedies in fact situations wherein
they were not previously available, the inconsistency in the use of the con-
cept "remedial right" becomes apparent."' Originally, the difference in
57. 261 U.S. 491 (1923).
58. The Delaware statute "does not give rise to any substantive right in the credi-
tor. . . . It makes possible a new remedy because it confers upon the Chancellor a new
power. . . . Whatever its exact nature, the power enables the Chancellor to afford a remedy
which theretofore would not have been open to an unsecured simple contract creditor. But
because that which the statute confers is merely a remedy, the statute cannot affect pro-
ceedings in the federal courts sitting in equity." Id. at 499. Aside from reiteration for the
sake of emphasis this ratio decidendi offers no clue to the decision upon the legal level.
59. 110 U. S. 15 (1884). The statute dispensed with the general equity rule that, in
order to maintain a bill to quiet title, the party must be in possession and that his title
should be established at law or founded on undisputed evidence or long-continued posses-
sion. In this case the suit was brought by one out of possession against another out of
possession so the alternative of ejectment did not lie.
60. Quaere: When the remedy created is one which did not belong to the English courts
of chancery in 1789 and is one hitherto unknown in federal equity, may the state statute
then be properly labeled "remedial?" The Delaware District Court, which favors the
remedial rights doctrine, see supra note 6, held that a Delaware statute empowering its
chancellors to order or review an election of corporate directors did "provide a remedy" and
was "remedial." Perrott v. U. S. Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944) (statute
held unenforceable). On the doctrinal level such a conclusion seems justified by the novelty
of the remedy. However, the term "remedial" in this connection does not mean "adjective"
or "procedural" as in the Pusey & Jones case. It is used in its Hohfeldian sense to refer to
the right to judicial relief. Thus the state statute may properly be said to create a remedy
but it does not follow ipsofacto that state law may be disregarded. Christiansen v. Christian-
sen, 62 F. Supp. 341 (N. D. Tex. 1945) (statutory suit upon return of former owner to
recover an estate transferred under legal presumption of his death arising from seven years
absence held controlled by state law).
61. The cases applying the Pusey & Jones decision were no more explicit as to when a
statute was "remedial" and when "substantive." Guardian Savings & Trust Co. v. Road
Imp. Dist. No. 7, 267 U. S. 1 (1925) (statute allowing bondholders of Improvement District
to apply for receiver held to create substantive right); see McLaughlin v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 7 F. (2d) 177, 183 (E. D. La. 1925), aff'd, 17 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927);
Grover v. Merritt Development Co., 7 F. (2d) 917, 918-21 (D. Minn. 1925); Adams v.
Jones, 11 F. (2d) 759, 760 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 685 (1926); Henrietta
Mills v. Rutherford County, 32 F. (2d) 570, 574 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929), aff'd, 281 U. S. 121
(1930). But see First Nat. Bank v. Horuff, 65 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933). The confu-
sion of this distinction exists after the Erie case. Compare SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 48 F.
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treatment might have been justified as protecting the right to jury trialPc-
Since today the Federal Rules assume this protective function, decisions
based solely upon the question-begging" 3 term "remedial right" are no
longer significant.
64
Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943) (state statute authorizing liquidation of corporation held "reme-
dial") and Wall & Beaver St.Corp. v. Munson Line, 58 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1943) (federal
court may liquidate corporation although state court not so empowered) with Smith v.
Aeolian Co., 53 F. Supp. 636 (D. Conn. 1943) (statute authorizing courts to dissolve corpora-
tion held "substantive"); see Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F. (2d) 10, 13 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942),
rev'd, 319 U. S. 315 (1943) ("state statutory authority to bring a suit may be a substantive
right"); Schwaxz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 110 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940)
(state statute which creates new cause of action, as distinguished from a new remedy, is
enforceable); Rambo v. U. S., 145 F. (2d) 670 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945), crl. deni 'ed, 325 U. S.
858 (1945) (partition statute held "remedial").
62. In the Pusey & Jones case the simple contract creditor's "adjective right" was to
sue at law on his contract. The appointment of the receiver would have foreclosed the com-
pany its right to defend that action before a common law jury. As an example of "remedial,"
i.e., procedural statutes, Mr. Justice Brandeis discusses Whitehead v. Shattuck, 133 U. S.
146 (1891), wherein jury trial was also the controlling factor. See Comment (1923) 33 YA=aS
L.J. 193.
63. The avoidance of state law is none the less violative of the Eric policy if accom-
plished by directly labeling the rights "procedural" rather than through the employment of
the term "remedial" and the remedial rights rationale. In Gritith v. Bank of Nev, York,
147 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 874 (1945), the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals sustained a collateral attack upon a consent judgment of the New York
supreme court notwithstanding the fact that another state court had dismiszed a Eimilar
suit and held the consent judgment immune to collateral attack. The stare decisis effect
of this state decision denying equitable discretion was circumvented by stating, id. at
904: " . . since the matters here involved are procedural, the doctrine of Eric R. Co. v.
Torapkins... is not involved." This conslusion seems to have been justified by the citation
of cases decided before the Erie decision in which federal equity courts had set aside, enjoined
enforcement of, or ignored state judgments. Thus the use of "procedural" ceems to beg the
question. The Griffith decision, however, appears abrogated as the exercke of equitable
discretion to entertain a suit has since been held to be controlled by state law. Wes3 v.
Routh, 149 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). Compare with this summary dispoml of con-
trary state law, the statement of Judge Clark in Palmer v. Palmer, 31 F. Supp. 861, 865
(D. Conn. 1940), "When diversity exists and the matters in controversy exceed 3,000,
a federal court may properly consider an attack made upon the decrees of a state court of
probate. But the federal court may grant relief only when similar relief would be available
in the state courts of the district. ... Accordingly this action must be viewed a- though
it were brought in the Superior Court for Connecticut. I therefore limit myzelf to con-
sideration of such grounds of attack upon the probate decrees as would be conidered by
that court." See Note (1945) 54 YALE L. J. 637, 694-6 suggesting that the Second Circuit
might have accomplished exactly the same results in the Griffith case by using the equitable
remedial rights rationale. For another use of circular terms, see Fraser v. U. S., 145 F. (2d)
139 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 342 (1945) (whether communication is privi-
leged is "evidentiary" hence "remedial").
64. The Supreme Court is still attempting to distinguish between the two types of
statutes. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99 (1945), is the most recent doctrinal
exposition: "In Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra, the Court had to decide whether
a Delaware statute had created a new right appropriate for enforcement in accordance
with traditional equity practice or whether the statute had merely given the Delaware
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The Supreme Court has not yet resolved these conflicting doctrines and
settled the equitable remedial rights problem. Shortly after the Erie case,
the Court, on two occasions, said that federal equitable remedies were
those possessed by English chancery courts in 1789. 65 In Russell v. Todde0 it
left open the question of the effect of state law upon federal selection of
remedies. However, in Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Company 0 7 the con-
tinuation of the remedial rights doctrine was impliedly sanctioned when, on
the basis of federal law, the Court refused to grant two remedies specifically
authorized by Oklahoma statutes.P8
The latest decision, Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. York,09
though limiting the use of the doctrine, still preserves to the federal courts
an independent determination of the appropriate equitable remedy. In
October, 1931, Guaranty, as trustee for noteholders of a failing corporation,
cooperated in a plan to repurchase the outstanding notes. In January, 1942,
ten years and three months later, York brought a class action on behalf of
all non-accepting noteholders in the Southern District of New York, solely
because of diversity of citizenship, alleging a breach of trust by Guaranty
and seeking an accounting. The New York statute of limitations for such
actions was ten years. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 70 reversed a
summary judgment for Guaranty and held that a statute of limitations does
not affect substantive rights but merely bars the remedy; and that, on the
basis of the remedial rights doctrine, the federal court was free to apply its
own doctrine of laches.71 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ". . . if
Chancery Court a new kind of remedy. . .. Although traditional equity notions do not
give a simple contract creditor an interest in the funds of an insolvent debtor, the State
may, as this Court recognized, create such an interest. . . . But the Court construed the
Delaware statute merely to extend the power to an equity court to appoint a receiver on the
application of an ordinary contract creditor. By conferring new discretionary authority
upon its equity court, Delaware could not modify the traditional equity rule in the federal
courts that only someone with a defined interest in the estate of an insolvent person, e.g., a
judgment creditor, can protect that interest through receivership. But the Court recognized
that if the Delaware statute had been one not regulating the powers of the Chancery Court
of Delaware but creating a new interest in a contract creditor, the federal court would have
had power to grant a receivership at the behest of such a simple contract creditor, as much
so as in the case of a secured creditor." Id. at 106-7, note 3. These words are also mean-
ingless.
65. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U. S. 563, 568 (1939); Sprague v,
Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U. S. 161, 164 (1939).
66. 309 U. S. 280 (1940).
67. 312 U. S. 377 (1941), 50 YALE L. J. 1094.
68. The actilal decision seems proper from the standpoint of comity since the identical
issues were already being litigated in an action in the Oklahoma courts. The grounds of the
decision might, however, have been a discretionary withholding of equity jurisdiction rather
than an evasion of the state statutes through the remedial rights doctrine.
69. 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
70. 143 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
71. Id. at 521-528. The court held the suit not barred by laches because (1) York had
only obtained her notes in 1934 and (2) she had unsuccessfully attempted to enter another
action against Guaranty in 1940.
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a plea of the statute of limitations would bar recovery in a State Court, a
federal court ought not afford recovery." 72 Although the equitable remedial
rights doctrine was held inapplicable in this instance, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter sanctioned its use in other situations by saying: "This does not mean
that whatever equitable remedy is available in a State court must be avail-
able in a diversity suit in a federal court, or conversely, that a federal court
may not afford an equitable remedy not available in a state court." 3
From the holding of the case it is at least clear that a federal court may no
longer grant an equitable remedy in diversity actions where no relief would
be available in the courts of the state. Moreover, the court said that in no
case should the remedy granted by the federal court "lead to a substantially
different result" from that obtainable in the state courts7 The opinion
stressed the policy of the Erie rule and clearly stated that past terminological
classifications were not to be considered where the result would be a conflict
with that policyY5 Finally, Mr. Justice Frankfurter inveighed against the
creation of "an exception to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins on the equity side of a
federal court." 76
Despite this strong emphasis on uniformity within a state, the Court has
left a wide area of operation for a rule which seems inconsistent with the
Erie policy. By citing the Puse, & Jones case as an example of the correct
application of the doctrine,n the opinion indicated that the outcome of
litigation is not "substantially" affected by the federal court's refusal to
follow a state statute authorizing a simple contract creditor to apply for a
receiver without reducing his claim to judgment. If the federal judiciary
retains this much independence in remedy selection, the question arises
whether the York test will require local law to be followed in other situations
where different remedies are available in the two court systems. For exam-
ple, may the federal court grant specific performance or an injunction
72. 326 U.S.99,110 (1945).
73. Id. at 105. "State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court must give
simply because a federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal
to the State's courts. Contrarivise, a federal court may afford an equitable remedy for a
substantive right recognized by a State even though a State court cannot give it." Id. at 101.
74. "In essence, the intent of that decision (Erie] was to insure that, in all caea where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the came, so
far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.
The nub of the policy that underlies Erie . Co. v. Tompkins is that for the Eame transaction
the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a
block away should not lead to a substantially different result." Id. at 109.
75. "Erie 1.. Co. v. Tompkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal teminol-
ogy." "And so, putting to one side abstractions regarding 'substance' and 'procedure . .'
"A policy so important to our federalism must be kept free from entanglements vith ana-
lytical or terminological niceties." Id. at 109-10.
76. Id.at 111.
77. Id. at 106-7, note 3. See supra note 64.
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where only money damages are available in the state courts? The answer to
these and other questions, however, must await the treatment of the York
rule in future cases.78
IV
Clarification of the equitable remedial rights rationale depends upon the
premise that there are three,75 not two distinct jural concepts which comprise
any litigation: (1) substantive rights, which exist in the abstract and are
possessed by one person against those owing him a correlative duty; (2)
remedies, the relief afforded by the court to redress the infringement of a
substantive right; and (3) procedure, the mechanics of the judicial process
by which the substantive rights are determined and the remedies are ad-
ministered and enforced.' It is submitted that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins
requires that remedies be grouped either with the first category or with the
third so that, accordingly, state law or federal law shall dictate their issu-
ance.8 1 The choice is not compelled by doctrinal considerations and should
be made on policy grounds.
78. Most of those cases which to date have interpreted the York decision treat only the
applicability of state statute of limitations in federal equity suits. Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
150 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) extended the rule beyond diversity cases. "The essence of
[the York] holding is that . . .there should be no distinction in limitation periods in di-
versity cases.... And no sound reason is offered why such a distinction should be made
when, as here, the right sought to be enforced is created by a federal statute." Id. at 832.
Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945) (state statutes of
limitations govern federal equity suits under diversity jurisdiction); accord, Sheehan v.
Municipal Light & Power Co., 151 F. (2d) 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). In Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.
(2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) the exercise of judicial discretion for a court of equity to enter-
tain the suit was held to be controlled by state law. "Outcome" of a litigation "4extends as
much to determining whether the court shall act at all, as to how it shall decide, if it does."
Id. at 195.
79. See W. N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 150; W. W. Cooic,
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) 171-2; 1 POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE (1941) 119-20.
80. The tendency in the past has been to identify xemedies and procedure-a view
favored by judges desiring to uphold the remedial rights doctrine. See, e.g., 3 BOUVIER,
LAW DICTIONARY (1914) 2870 ("Remedy" defined as "the means employed to enforce a
right or redress an injury"); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 115 (1945) (dissent).
However, this prior association of the two concepts is irrelevant to characterization for
purposes of the Erie rule. The majority opinion of the York case in applying the Eric rule
distinguishes remedy, the "right to recover" from procedure, "the manner and the means
by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced." Id. at 108-9. But
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, with some of the judges and commentators favoring the remedial
rights rationale, desires to maintain the three classes as separate categories to be controlled
by state law, independent federal common law, and the Federal Rules respectively. The
policy of the Eric decision, however, seems to force a dichotomy instead of a three-fold
classification.
81. Because the terms "substance" and "procedure" have special meanings in terms of
legal consequences under the Erie rule, their use is avoided. Also, since the judicial response
provides the only meaningful criterion of definition, it seems immaterial how the group to
which remedies are appended is denominated. If it is desired that remedies be called "sub-
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The policy behind the Erie rule-uniformity within a state--would seem
clearly to direct that remedies be classed with "substantive rights" and
controlled by state law." Those rights -3 which are not distinguishable in
terms of any of the above three definitions should also be categorized accord-
ing to the Erie policy: state law must control if the position of the parties
at the completion of their litigation would differ from what it would be
after a state trial because of the legal rules applied.84 Such a scheme would
leave those rights that are distinctly "procedural" to the determination of
the federal courts.P For example, a state arbitration statute would seem to
be clearly procedural, since it prescribes not what ultimate relief will be
afforded to the parties, but merely the means by which their rights 'will be
adjudicated.t6 Similarly, a statutory method by which state courts are to
stantive," it should be remarked that the latter term is being used according to the Erie
syntax, a usage different from its meaning in the three categories, supra.
82. It also seems that the two must be classed together because theoretically "zub-
stance" cannot be set over against "remedy" as being mutually exclusive terms. So far as
"substantive" means operativp to create rights and duties, it depends vholly upon the
existence of a societal remedy or sanction. Insofar as society withholds a remedy or sanction.
a statute creates no rights or duties. See ANso., CoiesrnAcrs (Corbin's ed. 1930) 110-1;
SAL-1MND, JUMSPRUDENCE (1920) 437.
83. The term "rights" as used here does not refer to merely "substantive right-," but
includes any of the three classes defined by Hohfeld, op. cit. supra note 79, i.e., sub~tantive
rights, remedial rights, and procedural rights.
84. This is the York test set up by Mr. Justice Franu-urter, 326 U. S. 99 at 109. See
supra, note 74.
85. The doctrinal definitions of substantive rights, remedy and procedure are to be
applied in limine, reserving the test of the Eric policy only for those rights remaining in the
penumbra which cannot be so categorized. See R. H. THouLEss, How To Tsmu S=Ayr;XUr
(1939) 129, for logical justification of such a method. The beneficial provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules, e.g., pre-trial examination and the right of the judge to comment upon the evi-
dence, may be thereby preserved. Instances where the verbal definition of "procedure" as
the judicial means as contrasted with the jural ends (remedy) furnishes an adequate criterion
of characterization are: Johnson v. Riverland Levee Dist., 117 F. (2d) 711 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941) (State "Levee District Code" providing "complete law and code of procedure" vth
mandamus as the remedy held procedural); U. S. v. Soucy, 60 F. Supp. S00 (D. Minn. 1945)
(state statute prescribing method of instituting suit for contribution in state court held
inoperative in federal suit); Gillson -. Vendome Petroleum Corp., 35 F. Supp. 815 (E. D. La.
1940) ("executory process," a summary device for mortgage foreclosure, held procedural);
cf. Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U. S. 538 (1893). Similarly matters involving the federal
judiciary system only may be properly characterized as "procedural" so as to mahe state
law inapplicable to them. In re Real Estate Mortgage Guar. Co., 55 F. Supp. 749 (E. D.
Pa., 1944) (on issue of surcharge of a receiver appointed by a federal court state la, held not
controlling as receiver's bookkeeping is administrative matter of appointing court); Crozley
Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F. (2d) 925 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), arl. denid, 315 U. S. 813
(1942) (injunction against a litigation of the same issues in another district court pending
judgment in prior identical action was awarded according to federal law). But see Courmiler
v. Superior Oil Co., 60 F. Supp. 542, 543-4 (W. D. La. 1945) (suit to set aside preious judg-
ment of same federal court governed by state law).
86. However, all courts have not observed this distinction. For instance, "The right
created under the Pennsylvania statute for arbitration is purely remedial, for all that the
act has done is to add an additional remedy .... Therefore this court will not enforce a
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appraise stock,7 and the necessity of the cestui as a party to a suit by his
trustee,"' involve only the workings of the judicial process.89
Strong policy arguments can be made that nationwide uniformity of legal
rules is desirable in particular fields regulated by federal acts," such as an
investor's law based upon securities regulations, and in situations where
interstate problems are litigated in a diversity suit. 91 But however attrac-
state statute purely remedial in nature." Voutrey v. General Baking Co., 39 F. Supp. 974,
975-6 (E. D. Pa. 1941); accord, Karno-Smith Co. v. School District of Scranton, 44 F. Supp.
860 (M. D. Pa. 1942); see Murray Oil Products Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F. (2d) 381, 383
(C. C. A. 2d, 1944); The Maccabees v. City of North Chicago, 125 F. (2d) 330, 333 (C, C. A.
7th, 1942); California Prune & Apricot Growers' Ass'n v. Catz American Co., 60 F. (2d) 788
(C. C. A. 9th, 1932) (pre-Erie); 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (Supp. 1945) 112. But see
Pathe Lab. Inc. v. Du Pont Film Mfg. Corp., 3 F. R. D. 11 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) (arbitration
statute called "procedural").
87. Galdi v. Jones, 141 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944); Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 120 F.
(2d) 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). In Root v. York Corp., 56 F. Supp. 288 (D. Del. 1944) the
equitable remedial rights rationale was used to avoid following a Delaware stock appraisal
statute similar to the Connecticut statute held procedural in .the above two cases.
88. First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wis. Bridge Co., 98 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th,
1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 650 (1938). The Equity Rules were said to confer only "remedial
rights" so were unaffected by state law, id. at 420; see 1 T. A. STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY
PRACTICE (1909) § 512. But see Summers v. Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (S. D. N. Y. 1938)
(Equity Rule 27 termed procedural not remedial).
89. Resort to the remedial rights doctrine in these cases, supra notes 86-8, seems un-
necessary to explain a refusal to follow state law. Analysis of the nature of the rights in-
volved in terms of the three classes of definitions seems a more logical method of accom-
plishing the same result.
90. Other "federal specialties," i.e., fields in which national uniformity of jurisprudence
may be accomplished upon existing United States statutes, have been collected in Note
(1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 915, 922-5 and are beyond the scope of this discussion. For a sug-
gested method of limitation of the Erie principle in areas of substantive law, see Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins (1946) 55
YALE L. J. 267, 280-5.
91. The use of the equitable remedial rights rationale in this situation is demonstrated
by Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. (2d) 979 (C. C, A. 4th, 1944). In a class action by members
of a newly consolidated church against certain dissident former members an injunction was
granted by a federal court notwithstanding the fact that the supreme court of the state had,
on the basis of state law, previously refused an injunction to other members of the class in
an almost identical suit. In this instance the doctrine was applied to enable the federal
court to adjudicate a question involving two organizations spread throughout several states
independently of the law of any one of them. In unfair competition suits the same policy
problem arises, Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U. S. 672 (1942) (nationwide trade libel); see Zlinkoff, Erie v. Tompkins: In
Relation to the Law of Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1942) 42 Cot. L. REv. 955. But
see Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F. (2d) 663 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) (the need for
national uniformity of legal rules stressed but state law followed); Skinner Mfg. Co. v.
General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432, 438-40 (D. Nebr. 1943); Grocers Baking Co. v.
Sigler, 132 F. (2d) 498, 501 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942). For a complete repudiation of the use of
the remedial rights concept to achieve national common law, see National Fruit Product
Co. v. Dwinell-Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499, 504 (D. Mass., 1942), aff'd with approval, 140 F.
(2d) 618 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944) (Congressional enactment, not judicial legislation, is required),
The situation where a constitutional question arises in a diversity suit is a corrolary to the
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tive such developments may appear, they should be accomplished through
means other than the remedial rights ratonale0 2 The contention that the
doctrine is unsuited for this purpose does not condemn national uniformity
in these fields, but merely decries the employment of such tenuous distinc-
tions and classifications as a basis for such a substantial result.
It remains to be seen whether the test of the York case-affecting the
"final outcome" of the litigation-wuill put remedies in either category, or at
least bring consistency of treatment among the courts. Examination of post-
Erie decisions 9 3 discloses that the remedies of receivership,04 exoneration on a
bond,95 injunction, s partition,"7 election of corporate officers,c3 and reforma-
tion of a contract "I have been granted or denied contrary to state law; while
nterstate problem. The federal courts have then claimed the privilege to grant a remedy not
available in the state court in analogous situations. See Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc.,
52 F. Supp. 763, 770 (D. Del., 1943); Hottenstein v. York Ice Mach. Corp., 136 F. (2d) 9-14,
953 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943). Quare: should the remedies differ between the two court sy ten
merely because of the additional issue of constitutionality? See Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
150 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) which suggests a negative answer.
92. Under the Reed opinion in the Erie case, 309 U.S. at 90, Congress might, by amend-
ing the Rules of Decision Act, specifically provide for situations in which national common
law seemed desirable. Another legislative device might be to change the jurisdictional re-
quirements of the federal courts to allow such suits on grounds other than diverzit, and
alienage. See Comment (1941) 41 COL. L. Rnv. 104. The contrary view, abolition of diver-
sity jurisdiction altogether, is expressed in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dizzent in Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 336 (1943) and sources therein cited. But until such enactments
are effected, the Erie decision must govern the policy of federal jurisdiction.
93. While perhaps the intent of many of these decisions was merely to award remedies
consonant with substantive rights with no particular stress on federal or state remedies, the
fact remains that there is no consistency in when state law will be followed.
94. Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U. S. 377 (1941); Orth v. Trait Inv.
Corp., 132 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942); SEC v. Fiscal Fund, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 712 (D.
Del. 1943); see Maxwell v. Enterprise Wall Paper Mfg. Co., 131 F. (2d) 400, 402 (C. C. A.
3d, 1942); Homewood v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 55 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Do.
1944); Smith v. Aeolian Co., 53 F. Supp. 636, 63S (D. Conn 1943).
95. Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co,,312 U. S.377 (1941).
96. Purcell v. Summers, 145 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 4th, 1944); Black and Yates v
Mahogany Ass'n, 129 F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. den jd, 317 U. S. 672 (1942);
SEC v. Fiscal Fund, 4S F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); Dunn v. Wilson - Co., S1 F. Supp. 655
(D. Del. 1943); Griffith v. Bank of New York, 147 F. (2d) 899 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), cert.
denied, 325 U. S. 874 (1945) (suit to enjoin enforcement of state court judgment); cse Sun
Oil Co. v. Burford, 130 F. (2d) 10, 18 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942), rcv'd, 319 U. S. 315 (1943). How-
ever, an injunction has been often held "substantive" for Eric purposes. Elakstic Stop
Nut Corp. v. Greer, 62 F. Supp. 363 (N. D. II1. 1945); National Fruit Product Co. ,. DineU-
Wright Co., 47 F. Supp. 499 (D. Mass. 1942), aft'd, 140 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944);
Zachs v. Aronson, 49 F. Supp. 696 (D. Conn. 1943); see Ross v. Service Lines, 31 F Supp.
871 (E. D. Ill. 1940) (equitable defense of fraud).
97. Rambo v. United States, 145 F. (2d) 670, 671 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944), cert. denied, 325
U. S. 858 (1945).
98. Perrott v. U.S. Banking Corp., 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944).
99. Herzbergs, Inc. v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 42 F. Supp. 52 (D. Nebr. 1941),
af'd, 132 F. (2d) 438 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
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the rights to specific performance, 1' ° indemnity and contribution,1 °' estab-
lishment or enforcement of a lien, 10 2 subrogation, 10 3 quiet title, 10 4 redemption
of mortgage, 0 5 liquidation of corporation, 0 6 creditor's bill,"°7 establishment
of a trust,'13 accounting, 10 9 bill to set aside a judgment,"0 cancellation of
insurance contract,"' construction of a will "1 and foreclosure of lien 11
have been governed by state law. It is to be hoped that the trend towards
limitation of the equitable remedial rights rationale and the strict applica-
tion of the Erie policy evinced in the York case will lead eventually to com-
plete elimination of the doctrine.
100. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Tr. Co. v. Titus, 41 F. Supp. 171 (S. D. Tex. 1941),
rev'd on other grounds, 134 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943). Pitcairn v. Rumsey, 32 F. Supp.
146 (W. D. Mich. 1940); Moreschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
101. Bohn v. American Export Lines, 42 F. Supp. 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Gray v. Hart-
ford Acc. & Indem. Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W. D. La. 1940); Kravas v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea
Co., 28 F. Supp. 66 (W. D. Pa. 1939).
102. United States v. Certain Lands in Highlands, N. Y., 49 F. Supp. 962 (S. D. N. Y.
1943). But see First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 132 F. (2d)
114, 118 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 749 (1942).
103. Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 51 F. Supp. 459 (W. D. Pa. 1943).
104. McAndrews v. Belknap, 141 F. (2d) 111 (C. C. A. 6th, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
721 (1944). But see Harlan v. Sparks, 125 F. (2d) 502, 506 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942). 0
105. Smith v. Schlein, 144 F. (2d) 257 (App. D. C. 1944).
106. SEC v. Fiscal Fund, 48 F. Supp. 712 (D. Del. 1943); Wall & Beaver St. Corp. v.
Munson Line, 58 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1943); Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, 52 F. Supp.
763 (D. Del. 1943). Contra: Smith v. Aeolian Co., 53 F. Supp. 636 (D. Conn. 1943).
107. Keene v. Hale-Halsell Co., 118 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
108. Robinson v. Linfield College, 136 F. (2d) 805 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943), cert. denied, 320
U. S. 795 (1943); Bruun v. Hanson, 103 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), cert. denied, 308
U. S. 571 (1939); Palmer v. Palmer, 31 F. Supp. 861 (D. Conn. 1940).
109. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Parsons, 144 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. Sth, 1944), cerl. denied,
323 U. S. 796 (1945); Schwartz v. Artcraft Silk Hosiery Mills, 110 F. (2d) 465 (C. C. A. 2d,
1940). Contra: Root v. York Corp., 56 F. Supp. 288 (D. Del. 1944); cf. Maxwell v. Enter-
prise Wall Paper Mfg. Co., 131 F. (2d) 400,402 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942).
110. Fakouri v. Cadais, 147 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945); Park v. Park, 37 F. Supp.
185 (N. D. Ga. 1941); rev'd on other grounds, 123 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
111. Park v. Park, cited supra note 110; Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Teal, 34 F.
Supp. 714 (E. D. S. C. 1940) semble.
112. Howell v. Deady, 48 F. Supp. 104 (D. Ore. 1939).
113. Meyer v. City of Eufaula, 132 F. (2d) 648 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942). But see First
Trust & Say. Bank v. Iowa-Wis. Bridge Co., 98 F. (2d) 416, 420 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert.
diied, 305 U. S. 650 (1938).
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